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Abstract: This paper focuses on two aspects of the welfare state: the old age
pension system and the labor market, where the majority of youth are working
in precarious jobs. We discuss the interplay between pension funds and the
increase in young atypical workers by studying the case of Italy and the Republic
of Korea, closely analyzing the projected benefit level of both standard and non-
standard workers among the youth population in Korea in order to assess where
young workers will find themselves after retirement age and what Korea can
learn from the case of Italy.
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INTRODUCTION
The attention given to the financial crisis in the Mediterranean economies has
given rise to a discussion on the future of Mediterranean welfare states. While some
argue that the overall high social spending and inefficiency by the government have
led to financial deficit, others specifically emphasize the high proportion of social
spending on old age pensions as one of the reasons (Kim, 2010). For example, in
2009, Italy, which is one of the most mature welfare states among the Mediterranean
welfare states, spent 13 percent of its GDP, that is, 46.8 percent of total social expendi-
ture, on old age pensions and pensions to surviving spouses. This is the highest level
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in the world; Germany spends around 9.1 percent of its GDP, Finland 10.2 percent and
the United Kingdom only 6.7 percent (OECD, 2010).
The discussion about the future of the Mediterranean welfare states has also
received much attention in the Republic of Korea, which is commonly seen as one of
the developing welfare states among the advanced Asian economies. Here the term
“developing welfare state” refers to a welfare state that has a low total social expendi-
ture but nevertheless appears to be on a trajectory of increasing its social expenditure.
In the Republic of Korea, total social spending consisted only 9.3 percent of the GDP
in 2012. While there is not much consensus yet on the characteristics of the Korean
welfare state and what direction it might go in, there does seem to be a fair amount of
consensus on the need for further welfare state development. Korean policy makers
have been closely analyzing other developed welfare states in the West in an effort to
find the ideal future path, and questions as to how much the country should spend and
on whom are still open to debate.
Pension reform has been at the center of the discussion in the policy-making arena
in many advanced economies. Studies on pension reform have focused on the negative
effect of aging on the pension fund. It has been suggested that the decreasing fertility
rate and the aging population in both the East and the West may financially compromise
state pension funds. At the same time, the increase in atypical workers has garnered
much attention, and many studies have begun to investigate nonstandard employment
using different terms, including “precarious worker,” the “precariat” (Standing, 2009),
“atypical employment” or “nonregular employment” (Keizer, 2008). Suggested expla-
nations for the rise in precarious employment are globalization, deindustrialization,
demographic change, and an increase in female employment. The literature explains
that in postindustrial economies there is a high premium for skilled labor and educated
people and that low-skilled workers are thus forced into low -value-added, low-wage
jobs (Bonoli, George, & Taylor-Gooby, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 2004; Kalleberg,
2009; Krugman, 1996; Pierson, 1994; Standing 2009).
While addressing the increase in atypical employment and undertaking old age
pension reform both rank high on the political agenda in many welfare states in East
Asian and in the Western European countries, the two are seldom discussed together.
In the pension reform discussion in particular, the question of the future of youths and
their working status is rarely discussed. Hence, this paper focuses on two aspects of
the welfare state, namely the old age pension system and the labor market, where the
majority of youth are working in precarious jobs. We discuss on the interplay between
pension funds and the increase of young atypical workers by studying the case of the
Italy and the Republic of Korea.
In investigating pension reform and its relation to the youth labor market, this
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paper adopts the method of agreement, according to which “if two or more instances
of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the
circumstance in which alone all the instance agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon” (Mill, 1882, p. 280). Here, Korea and Italy reveal commonalities when
it comes to their labor market and pension reforms, despite numerous differences in
their profiles as welfare states.
Italy has been differently classified within conservative and Mediterranean welfare
state models (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). Although it
is not the objective of this article to debate the welfare regime, we can say that the Italian
system shares many characteristics of conservative welfare states (social insurance
dominates, generosity with respect to entitlements is based on the worker’s position in
the labor market, there is a medium-high level of social stratification and a medium
level of decommodification) but also the peculiarities of welfare states typically found
in the Mediterranean, for example, a heavy reliance on clientelism (Ferrera, 1993).
On the other hand, Korean welfare state has been commonly classified as an East
Asian welfare state that shows affinities with the developmental welfare state and
Confucianism welfare state. Asian welfare states have been identified as variants of
“corporatism without worker participation,” “subsidiarity without the Church,” “soli-
darity without equality,” and laissez-faire without libertarianism” (Jones, 1993, p. 214).
Characteristics of Confucianism, which is embedded in many social norms and institu-
tions and in much of the culture of East Asia, include respect for seniors, filial piety,
paternal benevolence, a putting of the group before the individual, conflict avoidance,
loyalty and dutifulness, lack of complacency, striving for learning, entrepreneurship,
meritocracy, and a family orientation structured around patriarchal authority (Goodman
& Peng, 1996).
Despite these differences the form of the welfare state in the two countries, we find
noticeable similarities in their labor markets and pension systems. Focusing on the
precariousness of the future pension benefiters, who are the working youth now in the
two countries, we investigate these similarities in order to understand how youths in
both countries are experiencing or will experience precariousness.
We now take up the different welfare states of the two countries and then consider
Italy, focusing in particular on its pension system and the labor market. Next, we
examine Korean pension reform and the country’s current pension system, including
pension obligation, coverage, and replacement rate. Finally, we closely analyze the
benefits both standard and nonstandard workers among the youth population in Korea
can expect to receive after they retire in order to assess the probability that they will
fall into poverty after retirement age, drawing conclusions about what Korea can learn
from the case of Italy.
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WELFARE STATES OF ITALY AND KOREA
Italy is one of the most mature Mediterranean welfare states; it was one of the first
European countries to introduce basic social policies and it has the highest level of
social spending among Western welfare states. While the level of social spending has
increased in Korea, the country currently spends only one third of the total on social
spending of the Mediterranean welfare states, including Italy (fig. 1). However, as
noted, Korea will likely increase its social expenditure in the coming years, and hence
the case of Italy has a number of implications with respect to the direction that Korean
welfare state development may take.
The Italian welfare state has five main characteristics (Ferrera, 1993; Ascoli, 2002).
Particularism predominates over universalism; clientelism is widespread; there is a high
level of dualism; cash benefits prevail over services; and a “familialistic-patriarchal”
culture reigns. The prevalence of particularism over universalism reflects the conserva-
tive nature of the Italian social protection system, although there are universal features,
for example, the national health care system (created in 1978), and an old age pension
fund (introduced in 1979). Particularism has deep cultural and political roots. Surpris-
ingly, the Italian left has never proposed taking the Italian welfare state in a universalistic
direction (following the example of the Scandinavian countries).
In Italy, a diffused “clientelistic” culture and the use of the welfare state (as well as
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Figure 1. Total Social Spending in the Mediterranean Welfare States and the Republic
of Korea
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
public administration) to win elections is widespread. The majority of laws that have
been passed in parliament were not conceived to protect citizens but rather to curry
favor specific groups to gain electoral support. As shown by Ugo Ascoli (2002)
between 1976 and 1980 there were 200 laws passed in the parliament to modify the
pension system. This means that the Italian parliament passed an average of 40 laws
every year related to pensions, which had the effect of badly fragmenting the system.
Pensions become an instrument for “clientelistic politics,” dramatically impacting the
expenditure level. We could highlight other examples of this type, such as disability
pensions that were distributed to people in poor areas or the early retirement programs
(see Ascoli, 2002).
There are two main types of dualism embedded in the Italian system: a regional
dualism that reveals a marked difference between the functioning of the system in the
northern and the southern regions, and a generational difference, with young people
highly affected by recent retrenchments in the level of generosity of unemployment
benefits and the level of generosity of pension replacement rates. The superior func-
tioning of the welfare state in the north is explained by the different modernization
processes that took place in the country between the end of the 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century. Many social provisions at the time were guaranteed by
“opere pie” (private religious charity). The public system successively consolidated
this original structure; in the north, but while services become more efficient and
widespread in the north, where opere pie was more in evidence, in the south the modern
creation of the welfare state did not produce the expected outcomes. The welfare state
and the public administration become in this context subject to a strong “clientelism,”
which provides an occasion to employ more people than necessary in areas with high
unemployment rates (therefore especially in the poor regions of the south) rather than
offer a real safety net of services. Sabino Cassese defines this mechanism the “merid-
ionalization” of public administration and social services. Southern Italians have been
massively employed in public administration and welfare state services in an effort to
reduce unemployment rates.
The Italian welfare state has been built mostly with pensions in mind, providing a
limited financial support to other welfare services, for example, unemployment welfare
(0.4 percent of GDP in 2007) and family welfare (1.4 percent of GDP in 2007). The
Italian welfare state is also almost entirely based on cash benefits rather than services.
This is because political parties have sought to use the welfare state as an instrument
to gain votes by, for example, providing cash benefits as disability pensions rather than
to create a universal set of services. A welfare state based on services does not serve
clientelistic purposes as readily as one based on cash assistance. The last element that
characterizes the Italian welfare state is the impact of the familialistic-patriarchal culture
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that has largely excluded women from the labor market (with the result that women
receive a small number of social benefits). The 1980s and 1990s brought significant
change, but the position of women, especially in the southern regions, remains precarious.
The Korean welfare state was shaped against a different historical background. Lee
(2011) suggests that dualism between workers in large companies and small- and
medium- size companies has been intensified in the postindustrial period. That dualism
has been transmogrified into one between standard and nonstandard workers. For
example, Korea’s national pension and insurance system initially encompassed only
workers in large firms, and the disparity in welfare protection between large companies
and small- and medium-size companies was large.
Ringen, Kwon, Yi, Kim, and Lee (2011) suggest that the ideology of a develop-
mental welfare state prevailed in Korea from 1961 to 1987 and that a number of social
assistance programs, social insurance, and social service programs were legislated;
however, the range of these programs was still remedial and selective. From 1987 to
1998, welfare spending expanded continued to grow under Kim Dae-Jung’s govern-
ment. Ringen et al. (2011) have suggested that democratic consolidation and productive
welfare were the prevailing ideologies in this period. Social policy has been linked
with and subordinated to the supreme goal of economic development. Having rapid
economic growth as its primary goal, Korea suppressed dissidence that might have
challenged economic development.
One camp maintains that the Korean welfare state entered a new period after the
democratization of the late 1980s that gained momentum in 1990s, while another fac-
tion argues that Korea is still a developmental welfare state (Kwon & Holliday, 2007).
However, others like Takegawa (2009) explain that it was only under Kim Dae-Jung’s
presidency (1998-2002) that the welfare state was established in Korea in the form of
a productive welfare state. Similarly, Hort and Kuhnle (2000) suggest that East Asian
countries are in many cases already following the “route to modernity” taken by their
predecessors in Europe. They highlight that Korea has been gradually building a modern
welfare state since the late 1980s.
Some underscore the influence of Confucianism in East Asian welfare states
(Goodman & Peng, 1996) and argue that Confucian culture is reflected in the trend
toward the participation of women in the labor market. The female labor market 
participation rate has been around 50 percent over the past decade (49.7 percent in
2011), which is about 24 percent lower than the male labor market participation rate.
The peculiarity of the Korean female labor force emerges when one examines female
labor market participation rate by different education levels. While education level
usually correlates with a high employment rate for women in advanced economies like
Italy, in Korea, the labor market participation gap between men and women widens as
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their education level increases. A familialistic-patriarchal culture grounded in Confu-
cianism has largely excluded women from the labor market in Korea.
Despite the differences in the characteristics and historical background of the two
welfare states, there are similarities between the two countries’ labor markets and 
pension reform initiatives. In Both Korea and Italy, a the labor force is aging fast, and
there is also a large proportion of marginal workers. Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro
(2010) have calculated the size of the shadow economy in both developed and underde-
veloped countries. They define the shadow economy as one that includes “all market-
based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public
authorities to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment
of social security contributions; [to avoid] having to meet certain legal labour market
standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc;
and [to avoid] complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing
statistical questionnaires or administrative forms” (2010, p. 444). Both Korea and Italy
have one of the largest shadow economies among the developed economies.
Labor markets in both Korea and Italy also seem to have a large proportion of non-
standard workers. The temporary employment rate is 12.8 percent (fig. 3) in Italy and
27.8 percent in Korea (fig. 5). The unemployment rate and nonstandard employment
rate are higher for the youth group compared to other age groups in both countries and
the rate of low-income employment is also high for this group (Nam, 2011). In the
case of youth unemployment, the rate is 27.8 percent in Italy and 9.8 percent in Korea.
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Table 1. The Size of the Shadow Economy in Selected OECD Countries (%)
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Average
USA 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.6
UK 12.8 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.2 12.5
Germany 16.4 15.9 16.3 16 15.3 16
Sweden 19.6 19.1 18.7 18.6 17.9 18.8
Spain 23 22.4 22.4 22.4 22.2 22.5
Korea, Rep. 28.3 27.3 26.8 26.3 25.6 26.8
Italy 27.8 26.7 27 27.1 26.8 27
Source: Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro 2010.
PENSION REFORM AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN ITALY
Among the developed OECD countries Italy has an average level of spending
(24.86 percent of the GDP [OECD, 2010]). Italy spends less than France, Sweden,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Finland but more than Portugal, Greece,
Spain, Greece, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland,
New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, the United States, Australia, and Korea. However, the
crisis of the Italian welfare state may not have been caused by the level of expenditure
but by choices the state made regarding the distribution of the spending. The lack of
balance is clear if we compare the expenditure for old age pensions and surviving
spouses with the expenditure for both active labor market policy (ALMP) and passive
labor market policy (PLMP).
In 2007, Italy spent 14 percent of its GDP, equivalent to 57 percent of total social
expenditure, on old age pensions and pensions for surviving spouses. The proportion
of expenditures for cash assistance is high, while the expenditures for services are low.
Social spending on unemployment protection and ALMP was less than 1 percent of
the GDP (fig. 2).
The Italian pension system operated until 1996 on the basis of a defined benefit
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Figure 2. Proportion of Italian GDP (%) Expended on Old-Age, Family, and Unemployment
Programs and on ALMP
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
(DB) mechanism. The pensions were not directly connected to the general contribution
of each worker, as happens in a defined contribution (DC) system, but calculated on
the basis of the last salary. The Italian system up to this time was based on the absence
of reserves; all contributions were used to pay present pensions. However, the excessive
generosity of the DB mechanisms (with most pensioners earning pensions that
exceeded their contribution) and the clientelism brought the Italian pension system
close to bankruptcy in the early 1990s.
Until the early 1990s, an individual’s pension was calculated on the basis of the last
salary. Therefore, those who worked for 35 years received at least 80 percent of their
last stipend (this percentage went up to 95-100 percent for civil servants). On top of
this, the pension was revaluated on the basis of the increase of real salaries and infla-
tion. This system was the most generous ever created in a developed country.
The Amato reform in 1992 was the first step in the process of reform concluded 
in 2012. This reform increased the retirement age and instituted a revaluation of the
standard pension that only took inflation into account and no longer an increase in real
salaries. Furthermore, for the first time, private complementary pension schemes were
introduced. The 1995 Dini reform constituted a landmark in the progressive passage
from a pension system based on the DB to one based on the DC. The reform proposed
a transition to a much less generous system in terms of replacement rates; thus, a
worker fully enrolled in the DB system obtained a pension with a replacement rate
between 80 and 100 percent of his or her last salary; a worker fully enrolled in the DC
scheme obtains today a replacement rate of around 50 percent of his or her last salary.
In this respect the Dini reform manifests all the elements of Italian particularism. It
was necessary to avoid the explosion of the system but the reform impacted only
young people. With the 1995 reform the pension system was segmented in three parts
(accompanied by three different ways of calculating the replacement rates), the goal
being a progressive harmonization toward the defined contribution system. The first
segment includes the “privileged” that will receive their pension on the basis of a 
generous DC system. These people are those with more than 18 years of contribution
in 1995 (basically people that started to work before 1978). The second segment
includes people that started to work after 1978 and have a contributory history of less
than 18 years in 1995. Their pension is now calculated using a mixed scheme (based
on DB before 1995 and DC after this date). The third category includes all people who
started to work after 1995. Their pension will be entirely calculated using the DC 
system. Payouts will consistently drop for the cohort that began work after 1995 in
comparison to those of the first segment (from 80-100 percent of the last salary to 50
percent).
The problem of people who had more than 18 years of service in 1995 not having
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their pension subject to the mixed system has been partially handled by the Ferrero
reform (2011-2012). Starting in 2012 all people were covered by a DC system, but
only after that date. So the pension of people who had more than 18 years of contribution
in 1995 will now be calculated via a mixed system: DB until 2011 and then DC after
2012. The Dini reform, along with other reforms took place after that, has been seen as
monumental. In 2000, it made it possible to establish individual pension plans, and in
2004 the Maroni Reform introduced an incentive to retire later. In 2007 the Prodi
reform increased the retirement age, and finally in 2011-2012 the Fornero reform (as
already noted) harmonized the DC system. However, intragenerational inequity is not
the sole problem of the system. There is also a very high level of inequality among
people of the same generation that is strictly related to the contributory-insurance
mechanisms.
One might wonder why these reforms come so late. The answer lies in the resis-
tance of trade unions, who protected the right of people who were already in the system
and disregarded young people. This disregard might be explained by the fact that
members of trade unions are overwhelmingly retired or started to work before 1978.
Italy has 18.6 million pensioners (Ferragina, 2013). 11.6 million of those retired
have a pension below 1000 Euros (they represent 63 percent of the total), and Italy
spends 33 percent of the pension budget on them (the aggregate average of their 
pension is 533 per month [Ferragina, 2013]). On the other, 2 million of those retired
have a pension greater than 2000 per month. They represent 11 percent of the total,
but 31 percent of the pension budget (the aggregate average of their pension is 2909s
[Ferragina, 2013]). What this means is that Italy spends more or less the same amount
of money on the poorest 11 million pensioners and the wealthiest 2 million. However,
this difference is not justified by the contributory history, because the DB mechanism
offered a very high replacement rate to people who might have insufficiently contributed
to their pension. As clearly shown by Ferrera (2002), people who started to work
before 1978 have contributed a bit less than half of their current pension. A large
cleavage among the generations and among the pensioners of the same generation
whose earning levels were different has thus been developed. The system has created
the expectation of receiving a very generous pension, even though the real contribution
is small. In a nutshell, Italy has created an unsustainable pension system that is 
currently funded by youth who are working in nonstandard jobs.
Italy spends only 0.9 percent of the GDP on ALMP and PLMP. This level is less
than half of what France and Germany spend (OECD, 2010) (fig. 2). The difficulty the
Italian government has faced in refashioning the labor market is intrinsically linked 
to the pension system and intergenerational inequality. The Italian labor market is
characterized by dualism. By dualism we mean the enormous difference in the social
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benefits allocated to the insiders with a permanent contract, who will also benefit 
from a generous pension based on the DB system, and the outsiders with a fixed-term
contract and no unemployment protection, who will receive a pension based on the
DC system. The OECD employment outlook (2011) describes a situation in which the
labor market is becoming more dualistic. The economic crisis has impacted mainly
young people (people between the ages of 15 and 25). During the recession period, the
youth unemployment rate increased by 9.7 percent, reaching 28 percent in April 2010
and there have been no signs of improvement since then. The Italian labor market 
is therefore more and more segmented: older workers have stable jobs, while young
people have more precarious jobs (fig. 3).
The Treu reform in 1997 was intended to increase the employment rate in the
southern region by providing incentives to temporary and part-time workers and by
privatizing employment centers, ending the government’s monopoly on employment
services. Regulations for nonstandard workers were further relaxed by the Biagi reform
in 2003. New job categories, such as on-call jobs and job sharing, were introduced.
Labor market regulations have been reformed; permanent workers’ jobs are still 
protected, but those of nonstandard workers are not. Despite the recent reform of the
labor market (that took place in 2012), Italy does not have a universal unemployment
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Figure 3. Italian Labor Market
Source: ILO 2011.
benefit. This means that many people are not protected against the risk of unemploy-
ment. This situation is particularly problematic for the weakest groups (young people,
women, the disabled, and migrants). Most young people employed on fixed-term con-
tract will not receive any unemployment benefit if they will lose their job (Ferragina
2013).
PENSION REFORM AND THE LABOR MARKET IN KOREA
As in Italy, spending for old age constitutes the highest total social spending in
Korea (fig. 4). The Korean national pension system was first introduced in 1973. 
Park (2011) explains that the national pension was established in order to secure capital
to support the development of heavy and chemical industry. However, the system
immediately faced difficulties due to the 1973 oil crisis and was postponed for the next
14 years. The pension was reintroduced in 1988 following the enactment of the new
National Pension Act in 1986. Yang (2008) explains that the legislation was imple-
mented to ease the tension caused by democratization and the labor movement in the
late 1980s. Under the revised pension 1986 act, workers in companies with more than
10 workers were eligible to receive a pension with a replacement rate of 70 percent.
The insurance rate for the contribution was 3 percent for the first five years and 6% for
the following five years and 9 percent thereafter.
The Korean pension system was reformed twice after its implementation in 1988,
due to projected financial difficulties. The coverage was expanded to encompass
workers in companies with five or more employees in 1992 and in 1995; coverage was
supposed to further be expanded by 1999 to take in rural areas and also self-employed
workers, which would have made the pension system a national one that covered the
entire working population. However, before a national pension system could be 
implemented, various issues, such as financial stability of the fund, the public’s lack of
trust in the government’s management of the fund, and failure in to cover all working
population, were raised (Kwon, 1999). In particular, the contribution level of the first
pensioners was very low, while the replacement rate was high, and the aging of the
population worsened the imbalance in the pension fund, leading to the first pension
reform in 1998 (Kim, 2010).
The first pension reform was enacted to extend the coverage to the entire urban
population, including self-employed workers in urban areas, to reduce the replacement
rate of those who contributed for more than 40 years from 70 percent to 60 percent, iii),
to gradually raise the age of pensioners, from 61 in 2013 to 65 by 2033, and to calculate
and project the financial stability of the fund every five years. The first pension reform
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succeeded in adjusting the benefit level and in extending coverage to the whole popu-
lation (Kim Yun-myung, 1999), but the replacement was still remained high compared
to that of other countries, such as the United States (41 percent), the UK (40 percent),
France (50 percent) and Canada (40 percent) (Moon, 2003).
There are different types of pensions, such as old age pensions, disability pensions,
survivors’ pensions, lump-sum refunds, and lump-sum death payments. The majority
of the Korean pensioners are holders of the full old age pension, and generally those
who contribute for between 10 to 20 years start to receive the benefit beginning at age
60 (61 starting in 2013 and 65 starting in 2033). Residents between the ages of 18 and
60 are eligible to be insured. Pension holders are categorized into workplace- based
insured persons, individually insured persons, voluntarily insured persons, and volun-
tarily and continuously insured persons. Contribution is calculated by applying the
contribution rate to the person’s standard monthly income (the minimum income level
is W240,000 and the maximum is W3,890,000) (National Pension Service, 2012). The
contribution rate is 9 percent of income; in the case of workplace-based insured persons,
the employer pays 50 percent. Those who are individually insured, voluntarily insured,
and voluntarily and continuously insured pay the total contribution.
The formula for the basic pension amount (pension benefit) includes a redistributive
component and earnings-related element. The redistributive component is calculated
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Figure 4. Proportion of Korean GDP (%) Expended on Old-Age, Family Welfare, and Unemployment
Programs and on ALMP
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
as the average of the average monthly income (price indexed) for the last three years
prior to the pension payment. The earnings-related element is the average amount of
the standard monthly income of an insured person during the period he or she is
insured. This earnings-related element is adjusted to match the value of income during
the year prior to when the pension payments begins, and the revaluation is based on
the fluctuation rate of the redistributive component. While the function of the redis-
tributive component is to redistribute income, those who contributed little still benefit at
a relatively higher level, so to correct for this, the earnings-related component is applied,
which ensures that the more one contributes, the more of the benefit one receives.
The second pension reform took place in 2007 with the goal of decreasing the
replacement level from 60 percent to 50 percent in 2008 to 40 percent by 2028 (table
2) and introducing a basic pension that would cover all citizens. In addition, maternal
credits and military credit systems were also introduced.
The Korean pension system was introduced as a “high benefit and low contribu-
tion” system (70 percent replacement rate and 3 percent contribution rate), but since
then, the government has sought to decrease the replacement rate because, as noted,
the aging of the population and matured pensions created an imbalance in pension
fund (Moon, 2003) (table 2). Questions on the sustainability of the pension fund have
frequently been raised: the fund was projected to run out of money by 2047 unless it
was reformed, and some suggested that a full pay-as-you-go system with a 39 percent
contribution beginning in 2047 could defer the fund deficit until 2070 (Yoon, 2007).
Parliament passed a pension reform bill on July 3, 2007; under it, those with minimum
income who had contributed for 40 years and currently were receiving a pension benefit
with a 60% replacement rate would receive a benefit with a 50 percent replacement rate
until 2008 and a 40 percent replacement rate by 2028, the replacement rate annually
decreasing by 0.5 percent. Park (2012) suggests from his analysis that the pension
fund will be facing a deficit, despite the pension reforms, due to the more rapid aging
of the population than had originally been projected.
Like Italy, the Korean labor market has a dual structure that was formed during
industrialization and then strengthened by increased disparities between the standard
and nonstandard workers (Lee, 2012). Tertiarization and slower economic growth
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Table 2. Changes in the Replacement Rate in Korea
1988-1998 1999-2007 2008-2027 after 2028
Replacement 70% 60% 50% 40%Rate (reduced by 0.5%p annually)
Source: National Pension Service, 2013.
have been mediated by the dual structure between large firms and small- and medium-
size companies in Korea and Japan, creating the risk of dual labor markets, one standard,
the other nonstandard. There has been a sharp increase in the number of nonstandard
workers in Korea, who now make up about one third of total workers (as defined by
the government). The nonstandard employment rate rose from 27 percent (2001) to 36
percent (2007) in Korea (OECD, 2008). The proportion of temporary workers in
Korea is the second highest among the OECD countries (OECD, 2008), and the atten-
tion paid to nonstandard employment by both the mass media and academics in Korea
mushroomed in the mid-2000s. The OECD (2010) states that part-time workers have
lower hourly wages, on average, than full-time workers in almost all OECD countries.
Part-time workers’ hourly wages in Korea are between 50 to 60 percent of those of
full-time workers (OECD, 2010).
Definition of nonstandard employment varies by scholar, institution, and country
but in general describes workers who do not have a regular full-time job. In their
study, Kwon, Kim, and Choi (2008) classify waged workers in Korea by the duration
of the employment and by employment type. When classifying workers by duration of
employment, workers are categorized as either permanent (in Korea, this refers to
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Figure 5. Korean Labor Market
Source: ILO 2011.
those with a permanent contract or an employment contract that is longer than one
year), temporary (the employment contract is for less than one year), and daily (the
employment contract is for less than one month or one day). Kwon et al. (2008)
explain that when workers are categorized by employment type, they are either classi-
fied as standard or nonstandard workers, which is what the government uses for its
statistics. Employment types have different components, such as employment duration,
number of hours worked per week, and type of employer-employee contract type. In
Korea, nonstandard workers include contingent workers who have a fixed contract,
part-time workers who work less than 36 hours a week, and atypical workers such as
dispatch workers, in-home workers, freelancers, and so forth who have a nontraditional
employer-employee contract. Using the classification of workers by duration of
employment as defined by Kwon et al. (2008), nonstandard workers, such as contin-
gent workers, part-time workers and atypical workers, can also be permanent workers,
temporary workers, or daily workers.
The youth unemployment rate in the Korean labor market is twice as high as the
total unemployment rate. Hence, while the number of young people in the labor force
is declining in Korea, those that remain in it are more likely to be unemployed or to be
working in nonstandard jobs than the older members of the labor force (fig. 5).
INTERPLAY BETWEEN PENSION REFORM 
AND THE PRECARIOUS LABOUR MARKET IN KOREA
In this section, we conduct an analysis of the replacement rate of the pension workers
in Korea receive when they reach retirement age. As in Italy, nonstandard workers are
not securely insured by a pension system in Korea. The most precarious workers are
nonstandard workers (contingent workers, part-time workers, atypical workers) who
have employment contracts of less than one year; as note, the majority of the youth
population in Korea are nonstandard workers.
Nonstandard workers are eligible for the national pension system as workplace-
based insured persons. In addition, coverage of Korean national pension was expanded
in 2006 to covers workers in all places of employment (including self-employed workers
as individually insured persons and places of employment with one or more workers).
However, in 2007, only 13.9 percent of nonstandard workers were insured by the
national pension. Comparing the rate of permanent and standard workers, which is
98.7 percent, we can infer that nonstandard workers are excluded from the national
pension system due to their precarious working conditions. Kwon et al. (2008) suggest
that the short employment period, loss of job, and a low level of income hinder workers
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from making a contribution leading that would at least provide them with a small 
pension.
Not only is the coverage rate difference between standard workers and nonstandard
worker as high as 40 percent, but the average monthly income level of nonstandard
workers is about W1 million lower than the standard workers. The average duration of
employment is also about 50 months shorter in the case of nonstandard workers. The
low level of income, short total duration of employment, and the low rate at which
precarious workers are insured affects both the total amount of contributions made to
their pensions and the security of these precarious workers in old age.
Compared to other OECD countries, Korea has one of the highest rates of self-
employment, although the number of self-employed is declining. In Korea, the propor-
tion of waged and salaried workers increased from around 47 percent in 1980 to 68.15
percent in 2007, which is more than a 20 percent increase. However, the proportion of
self-employed workers decreased only about 10 percent in 2011, to 28 percent (the
proportion of self-employed workers decreased by 12 percent in Germany, 7 percent
in United States, 12 percent in Japan, and 25 percent in Italy in 2011). Both Korea and
Italy stand out as having a high rate of self-employed workers. Self-employed workers
in Korea refer to workers who are employers but who do not necessarily have any
employees (or those who have family members working for them but do not pay them
a wage) (Kim, 2012a). Self-employed workers in Korea frequently enter and exit the
labor market, which is what gives rise to their precarious working status. In addition,
irregular income levels of self-employed workers of small businesses face difficulties
in getting insured. Self-employed workers in Korea have both less income security
and employment security compared to waged workers, and so their insured rate is 
relatively low (Kim, 2012a).1
Precarious Working Youth and Pension Reform in the Republic of Korea and Italy 67
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
1. In principle, self-employed workers can be included in the individually insured person
category in the Korean national pension system, but due to difficulties in collecting their
contribution, they are separately classified as workplace-based snsured person.
Table 3. Insured Rate, Average Monthly Income, and Average Duration of Employment by
Employment Status in Korea
Year Category Standard Nonstandard
Rate of Insured Pension (%) 79.6 40.5
2012 Average Monthly Income (per W1000) 245.4 143.2
Average Working Period (Month) 81 29
Source: Statistics Korea, 2012.
The increase of nonstandard workers, high proportion of self-employed workers,
and the large number of unemployed youth have a number of implications for the 
pension fund. Kim (2012a) explains that contribution and pension benefit are highly
related to individual’s income level in Korea the two most important factors determining
an individual’s pension is his or her average income and duration of employment. In
her studies on the relationship between self-employed workers and pensions, Kim
(2012a) suggests that self-employed workers are more likely to face income insecurity
after retirement, as their income level and employment status is more precarious than
that of regular waged workers, which may affect their contribution period.
Compared with the pension entitlement rates of the total number of waged workers,
the rate of self-employed workers is lower. Insurance rates of temporary workers
(about 35 percent) and short-time workers (about 13.5%) are substantially lower than
those of full-time waged workers, which are about 35 percent. Frequent movement in
and out the workplace and their relatively low level of income means non-standard
workers and self-employed workers will likely find it difficult to contribute to the 
pension system.
Precarious workers in both Korea and Italy are not likely to be able to increase the
amount of the pension benefit they will receive in the short term for two reasons. The
first has to do with the decreasing replacement rate and the second relates to the way
the pension benefit is calculated. In the case of Italy, the gap between generations with
a defined benefit versus a defined contribution has widened in the wake of a series of
pension reforms. Likewise, in Korea, the replacement rate for those who are covered
before 1998 is 70 percent, whereas the rate for those who joined the program after
2028 is 40 percent (table 2). Furthermore, the Korean pension system is built on the
assumption of workers being employed in long-term jobs. That is, the 40 percent
replacement rate was established using those who contribute for 40 years as the frame
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Table 4. Pension Coverage Rate by Employment Types in Korea (2011)
Category Pension Insurance rate (%) Number of Insured
Self-Employed 57.26 3,149
Waged Workers, Total 64.23 18,166
Full-Time Workers 93.97 14,540
Temporary Workers
(Less Than One Year) 34.89 3,093
Short-Term Contract Workers
(Less Than One Month) 13.51 533
Source: Statistics Korea 2011.
of reference. However, it is not likely that many workers in Korea will be able to regu-
larly contribute to the pension for 40 years due to the high proportion of those working
in nonstandard jobs. As table 5 shows, both the average duration of employment 
and average income for nonstandard workers are substantially lower than that of the
standard workers.
The current youth in Korea faces an even more precarious future than the youth in
Italy. The unemployment rate for those between age 15 and 29 increased during the
years 2000 to 2009, while the employment rate decreased (Nam, 2011). Furthermore,
while the total temporary employment rate is decreasing, the rate among young people
is increasing, indicating that the working environment for them is becoming more pre-
carious. Young workers in Korea are relatively more exposed to low income after
retirement compared to the present owing to a pension system that is much less favor-
able to youth than to the older generation.
For this study, we first analyzed the benefit level of precarious workers to assess
their probability of falling into poverty after retirement age. We compared the average
income level and duration of employment of standard and nonstandard workers and
found that for nonstandard workers they are only about 60 percent of those of standard
workers, indicating a lower level of pension benefits for nonstandard as compared to
standard workers (table 5).
Next, we conducted a more detailed analysis of pension benefit levels by age group
and by employment status. The reason for calculating the benefit level for standard
workers and nonstandard worker separately is that the difference between them with
respect to average income level and average duration of employment is large. The
pension calculator provided by the Korean National Pension Fund (http://csa.nps.or.kr/
finance/pensionCal.do) requires information as to the initial year of contribution, years
of enrollment, and monthly income level. We calculated the replacement rate for those
aged 25, 35, 45 and 55 in 2013. The initial year of contribution is 2013, 2003, 1993 and
1990, respectively. The income level and contribution period are calculated differently
for standard workers and nonstandard workers, according to the data provided by
Sung Eun Mi (2007), who conducted an analysis using data from 1999 and 2005 the
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Table 5. Average Income and Working Period of Standard and Nonstandard Employment
Average Income Average Duration of Employment Period 
(per W10,000) (by Months)
Standard 245.4 267
Nonstandard 143.2 153
Source: Statistics Korea, 2012, and Seong, 2007.
Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). In making her calculations, she
assumed that employment patterns of individuals over a 7-year period was typical and
would be repeated until retirement age.
According to KLIPS, on average, standard workers contribute to the pension for
about 4.1 years out of 7 years, while nonstandard workers contribute 1.21 . Assuming
that workers work from the age of 25 to 60, meaning 35 years, we calculated that stan-
dard workers contribute for 267 months (4.10 /7)*(35*12)=267 months) and that non-
standard workers contribute 153 months (1.21/7)*(35*12)=153 months). Here we dis-
regard yearly price fluctuations in order to compare the value of the pension benefit
among different age groups at a given time point.
The results presented in table 6 indicate that the projected pension benefit of 
nonstandard workers is 30 percent to 40 percent less than that of standard workers.
Moreover, we can infer that the projected pension benefit of 25 year olds is 40 percent
to 50 percent less than that of those who are currently in their 50s. The situation is the
worst for those in the age 25 group who have nonstandard jobs. The projected pension
benefit for the 55 year olds is W987,350, while it is W518,850 for the 25 year olds in
the case of standard workers, while in the case of nonstandard workers the benefit
level is W527,250 for the 55 year olds and W237,450 for the 25 year olds. Young 
nonstandard workers will receive only fourth quarter of the benefit of 55-year-old
standard workers and about half of the benefit of the 55-year-old nonstandard .
Results from our analysis suggest that the youth group is projected to receive a
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Table 6. Projected Pension Benefit of Standard and Nonstandard Workers by Age Group
and
Contribution Amount Contribution Average Projected 
Age (%) in Received Period Income Pension Pension 
First Year (%) in (Months) (W10000) Age Benefits First Year (W)
55 90.01 12.03 62 987,350
Standard
45 93.01 15.03
267 245
851,610
35 03.01 25.03 65 618,450
25 13.01 35.03 518,850
55 90.01 02.09 62 527,250
Nonstandard
45 93.01 05.09
153 143
449,370
35 03.01 15.09 65 297,940
25 13.01 25.09 237,450
Source: National Pension System, 2013.
substantially lower pension benefit, regardless of their working status, and that the 
situation is worse when they work in nonstandard jobs. This is due to the decreasing
replacement rate (-0.5 percent p) and if we take into account the increasing nonstandard
employment rate among the youth group, the pension benefits of the young workers
are likely to further decrease. The pension benefit will be substantially insufficient to
cover a decent income of the youth when they retire. That is, the future of the youth
group in Korea seems especially more precarious compared to other age group, since
they face double the risk of working in non-standard jobs and also receive pensions
with a lower replacement rate (table 6).
CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on two aspects of the welfare state: the old age pension 
system and the labor market, where the majority of the youth are working in precarious
jobs. We have discussed on the interplay between pension and the increase of young
nonstandard workers by closely examining the pension systems in Italy and Korea,
using the case of the Italian welfare state to consider implications for Korea.
The Italian welfare state has been constructed mostly on the basis of pensions, 
providing limited financial support for other welfare services, and overwhelmingly
provides cash assistance in lieu of services. The crisis of the Italian welfare state may
not have been caused by the level of expenditure but by choices regarding the distribu-
tion of the spending. While a large share of welfare spending is allocated for old age
pensions, spending on the labor market, the family, and youth group is limited. Italy
has created an unsustainable pension system: young people who are working in a 
precarious labor market are currently paying for the pension but increasing spending
on young people is difficult due to structure of welfare spending.
As in Italy, spending on old age pensions constitutes the highest total social spending
in Korea. However, with a comparatively low level of total social spending, Korea is
mostly likely on the trajectory of increasing its welfare expenditure. As we noted at
the beginning, the ideal future path and questions as to how much the country is to
spend and on whom is still open to debate.
The study suggests that the pension benefit that Koreans who are young now will
receive will be insufficient to provide even the minimum income for them when they
retire. In other words, the future of the current youth cohort in Korea seems more 
precarious than that of other age groups: this cohort faces the double risk of working
in nonstandard jobs and also of receiving a pension with a lower replacement rate.
Moreover, in the case of Korea, the pension benefit level is structured to be twice as
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high as the contribution level, meaning that the younger generation is paying for the
future generation’s pension benefit (Kim, 2004). The 2030 labor force is likely to be
composed largely of teenagers or adolescents in their 20s, and they are likely to be
employed in nonstandard jobs or else unemployed. Lower pension coverage of this
young generation indicates their precarious status in the labor market and also their
precarious future.
This paper has demonstrated how the precarious status of youth people in the labor
market is closely associated with the their future pension benefit owing to the current
pension structure. This study suggests that the interplay between the precarious labor
market and the pension structure may result in income insecurity for current young
people employed in nonstandard jobs when they retire. Based on the analysis from this
paper, we can offer some policy suggestions, one of which is that the government
should intercede to address the precarious youth labor market in Korea. Korean youth
are more highly concentrated in nonstandard jobs compared to other age groups, and
the current pension structure creates blind spots by failing to cover these nonstandard
employments.
The government has been focusing on solving the issue of limited pension coverage
by expanding the compulsory enrollment in the pension program to any place of
employment with more than one worker. Also the Act for Protecting Temporary
Workers was introduced in 2007 to encourage employers to rehire their nonstandard
workers as regular workers. However, the pension coverage of nonstandard workers
still remains only half of that of the standard workers. Reason for this low level of
coverage is that both employers and employees have tended to opt out of the national
pension program to avoid the burden of contribution (Kang, 2008).
To address this problem, the government implemented the Duru-nuri social insurance
policy, which was intended to subsidize pension contributions for employers with
fewer than 10 employees who receive less than W1300,000 a month. This policy has
been only in effect nationwide since July 2012. Hence it is not possible yet to evaluate
the effect of the policy. However, we predict that the legislation will serve to expand
coverage of young people working in nonstandard jobs, since one of the main reasons
the coverage has been so low is that employers who own small companies are unable
to contribute on behalf of their employees.
The low level of average income of nonstandard workers—the average monthly
income of nonstandard workers is W1120,000 lower than that of standard workers
(Statistics Korea, 2013)—is another critical reason for the low level of projected pension
benefits for them. The Park Geun-hye government has recently developed and high-
lighted the policy of the time-selective job. This policy’s purpose is to subsidize social
insurance contribution and guarantee workers 130 percent of the statutory minimum
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wage. We can look forward to a decrease in the female and elderly unemployment rate
and a bettering of their working conditions, as this policy mainly targets women
whose careers have been interrupted due to child rearing and baby boomers who are
now retiring. However, this legislation may have only a limited effect on the problem
of the income insecurity the youth in the labor market face now and will continue to
face when they retire.
Therefore, a more fundamental policy that focuses on the precarious youth labor
market should be considered. The case of Italy suggests that the path dependence of
the welfare spending structure can produce not only a welfare state crisis but also a
precarious labor market made up of a large cohort of large youth people who face
income insecurity both before and after retirement age.
The working status of large numbers of Korean youth is precarious, and the lack of
attention given to this group and the concomitant focus on pension spending for current
benefiters may result in the Korean welfare facing similar welfare state challenges as
in Italy. Korea’s social spending is about 10 percent of the GDP, and it is projected to
grow. Given this critical situation, this paper suggests that Korea should increase its
labor market welfare spending, especially focusing on the youth population as its faces
the burden of income insecurity both in present and in the future.
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